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NOTE
INVERSE LIABILITY OF THE STATE OF WISCONSIN FOR
A DE FACTO "TEMPORARY TAKING" AS A RESULT OF
AN ERRONEOUS ADMINISTRATIVE DECISION: ZINN V.
STATE1
This Note examines Zinn v. State, a Wisconsin Supreme Court decision,
which held that plaintiff stated a claim for inverse condemnation against the
State of Wisconsin when, as a result of an erroneous quasi-judicial decision by the
DNR, plaintiff lost the use of her property for a little longer than a month. This
Note takes the position that Zinn represents the growing tendency among courts
to enlarge the scope of fact situations in which they will find a taking. Given this
tendency, and given that the substantive test in Wisconsin of what constitutes a
taking is identical whether a taking occurs as a result of the police power or power
of eminent domain, this Note argues that the remedy of inverse condemnation
should also be extended to police power takings when the latter produce the same
benefits to the Government and cause the same harm to the property owner as
would have occurred if the Government had used its power of eminent domain.

I.

INTRODUCTION

The "taking issue" continues to bedevil the courts. 2 As regulatory3 and non-regulatory 4 governmental activities become more
pervasive and impinge on private property values, the contexts in
which the taking issue can arise become more numerous, 5 and some-

1. 112 Wis. 2d 417, 334 N.W.2d 67 (1983).
2. Since 1977, the United States Supreme Court has faced the taking issue four
times. San Diego Gas & Elect. Co. v. City of San Diego, 450 U.S. 621 (1981) (compensability
of regulatory takings discussed but declined for lack of final judgment); Agins v. City of
Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255 (1980) (zoning ordinance effected no taking); Lake Country Estates v.
Tahoe Regional Planning Agency, 440 U.S. 391 (1979) (complaint stated a claim for relief
under section 1983); Penn Central Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104 (1978) (historic landmark preservation regulation effected no taking).
3. See, e.g., Devines v. Maier, 665 F.2d 138 (7th Cir. 1981) (enforcement of Housing Code resulted in a compensable taking of leasehold rights); McMahon v. City of Telluride,
79 Colo. 281, 244 P. 1017 (1926) (property of owner destroyed under mistaken belief that it
was a nuisance).
4. See, e.g., Griggs v. Allegheny County, 369 U.S. 84 (1962); United States v.
Causby, 328 U.S. 256 (1946); United States v. Lynah, 188 U.S. 445 (1903).
5. "The categories of regulation that have often generated litigation are those restricting mining, regulations for the preservation of open spaces, regulations that seek to eliminate existing uses, regulations of flood prone areas, wetlands, estuarine and beachlands, and a
variety of regulatory deterrents to urban growth." F. BOSSELMAN, D. CALLIES & J. BANTA,
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times unpredictable. 6 At the same time, this contexual variety has
rendered unsuccessful the judicial effort to formulate satisfactory
standards for determining when governmental action, which has .
caused loss to a property owner, constitutes a taking. 7 Nevertheless,
because of the commands of the fifth amendment to the United
States Constitution 8 and the various state constitutions, 9 if governmental action results in a "taking" of property, "just compensation" must be paid.
Ordinarily, a compensable taking occurs when a government
agency or private entity, which has been given express legislative
authority, 10 exercises its power of eminent domain to take private
property without the owner's consent.'' In such cases, the public
agency brings judicial action against the owner, and the value of the
owner's property is determined before title to property is transferred
to the agency. Occasionally, however, the government will take private property without the exercise of formal eminent domain (condemnation) proceedings. 12 In such a case, the property owner is entitled to bring an action called inverse condemnation to recover just
compensation. 13 Although there appears to be no single, settled defiTHE TAKING ISSUE 141 (1971).
6. In Rostker v. Goldberg, 453 U.S. 57 (1981), for example, plaintiffs contended,
inter alia, that the Military Service Act, 50 U .S.C. app. §§ 451-454, which requires the registration of every male citizen and resident, amounted to a "taking" of property without due process of law. Rostker, 453 U.S. at 61 n.2.
7. See Van Alstyne, Taking or Damaging by the Police Power: The Search for Inverse
Condemnation Criteria, 44 S. CAL. L. REv. 1, 2 (1971). See also Van Alstyne, Modernizing
Inverse Condemnation: A Legislative Prospectus, 8 SANTA CLARA L. REv. 1, 13-15 (1967).
8. The fifth amendment provides: "nor shall property be taken for public use without just compensation." U.S. CONST. amend. V. This provision is made applicable to the
states by the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment. See Chicago, B. & Q.R.R. v.
Chicago, 166 U.S. 226 (1897).
9. The constitutions of twenty-three states are broader than the fifth amendment
in that they require compensation when private property is "taken or damaged." See Note,
Inverse Condemnation: Its Availability in Challenging the Validity of a Zoning Ordinance, 26
STAN. L. REV. 1439, 1439 n.3 (1974).
10. The procedure for the appropriation of land for public use depends entirely upon
statutory law. See generally, 1 NICHOLS' THE LAW OF EMINENT DOMAIN§ 24.1 (J. Sackman,
rev. 3d ed. 1980) [hereinafter cited as NICHOLS'). See also Blair v. Milwaukee Elec. R. & L. Co.,
187 Wis. 552,555,203 N.W. 912,913 (1925); In re Milwaukee Elec. R. &L. Co. v. Becker,182
Wis. 182, 186, 196 N.W. 575, 577 (1923).
11. "Eminent domain is the power of the sovereign to take property without the
owner's consent." 1 NICHOLS', supra note 10, at§ 1.11, 1-7; See Stoebuck, A General Theory of
Eminent Domain, 47 WASH. L. REV. 553, 556-69 (1972).
12. See United States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256 (1946); Zinn v. State,ll2 Wis. 2d 417,
432, 334 N.W.2d 67,74 (1983). Chapter 32 of the Wisconsin Statutes provides the procedure
which the government must follow in condemning property for public use. WIS. STAT. §§
32.01-.09 (1981-82).
13. See Causby 328 U.S. 256; Zinn, 112 Wis. 2d at 432, 334 N.W.2d at 74.
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nition of the concept of inverse condemnation, generally it "describes a cause of action against a government defendant in which a
landowner may recover just compensation for a 'taking' of this
property under the fifth amendment, even though formal condemnation proceedings in exercise of the sovereign's power of eminent
domain have not been instituted by the government entity." 14
Thus, a claim in inverse condemnation may arise if some governmental activity, either by physical interference or regulation, deprives the owner of the use and enjoyment of his property such as to
constitute a de facto taking of the property.
In Zinn v. State, 15 the Wisconsin Supreme Court was presented
with an unusual case sounding in inverse condemnation. The plaintiff sought to recover damages for the "temporary taking," on paper, of her property by the Wisconsin Department of Natural Resources (DNR). 16 The alleged temporary taking occurred as a result
of an erroneous determination by the DNR 17 that the ordinary
highwater mark (OHWM) 18 of a certain lake, completely surrounded by plaintiff's property, was ten feet higher than it actually
was. 19 The DNR ruling, therefore, increased, on paper, the size of
the lake from fourteen acres to one thousand and nine hundred
acres, two hundred of which had belonged to the plaintiff. 20
The plaintiff petitioned for and obtained a rehearing from the
DNR, which resulted in a new ruling withdrawing and rescinding
the original ruling. However, the recission was not completed until
nearly two years after the original ruling. 21 Therefore, the plaintiff
14. San Diego Gas & Elect. Co. v. City of San Diego, 450 U.S. 621, 638 n.2 (1981);
Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255,258 n.2 (1980); United States v. Clarke, 445 U.S. 253,
257 (1980); see also, Maxey v. Redevelopment Authority of Racine, 94 Wis. 2d 375, 288
N.W.2d 794 (1980) (refusal of city to relicense a theatre entitles lessee to bring inverse con. demnation claim).
15. 112 Wis. 2d 417, 334 N.W.2d 67 (1983).
16. Id. at 421-22, 334 N.W.2d at 69-70.
17. This determination was made in a contested proceeding under Wis. STAT.§ 227
(1981-82). See infra note 98. In a con tested case the parties are given reasonable notice, and an
opportunity to present evidence and to rebut, or offer countervailing, evidence. The agency or
hearing examiner makes its determination on the basis of the record before it. The record
includes applications, pleadings, motions, intermediate rulings, exhibits, admissions and stipulations. See WIS. STATS. § 227.07 (1981-82).
18. OHWM means the point at which the "presence and action of the water is so
continuous as to leave a distinct mark either by erosion, destruction of vegetation or other
easily recognized characteristic." Diana Shooting Club v. Rusting, 156 Wis. 261, 272, 145
N.W. 816, 820 (1915) (citing Lawrence v. American W.P. Co., 144 Wis. 556, 562, 128 N.W.
440, 441 (1911)).
19. Zinn, 112 Wis. 2d at 421, 334 N.W.2d at 69.
20. Id.
21. Id.
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sued the State to recover damages and compensation for the period
in which the original ruling had been in effect. 22
The State moved to dismiss the complaint for failure to state a
claim upon which relief could be granted. 23 The trial court denied
the motion. The State appealed the ruling. The court of appeals reversed and granted the State's motion. 24
The Wisconsin Supreme Court granted plaintiff's petition for
review and held that the complaint stated a claim for a temporary
taking for which compensation is compelled under the Wisconsin
Constitution. In so holding, the court rejected policy arguments the
State advanced to preclude a finding of a taking in a quasi-judicial
context. It also found irrelevant that the State had not consented to
be sued in Zinn.
This Note will examine the Zinn decision and show that, although the substantive test in Wisconsin of what constitutes a "taking" is rather restrictive, Zinn represents the growing tendency
among courts to enlarge the scope of fact situations in which courts
will award damages for a taking. The court's finding of a taking in
this unusual context, its articulation of when a taking occurs, its
willingness to award damages for a very temporary taking, coupled
with its unequivocal rejection of the defense of sovereign immunity
to a taking in violation of the state constitution, indicate this tendency. Part II of this Note will set forth the substantive standards
in Wisconsin governing a claim for a taking, and then discuss their
application to the Zinn case. Part III will discuss the remedies for a
taking under the Wisconsin Constitution. In particular, this part
will discuss the inverse condemnation remedy in Wisconsin and will
examine the implications of Zinn for the status of this remedy in
police power "taking" cases in light of developing federal law and
the competing policies militating in favor of and against this particular remedy. The Note will then conclude that, on balance, the Wisconsin Supreme Court's apparent inclination to grant monetary relief to owners whose property is unconstitutionally interfered with,
even for a very temporary period and in an unusual context, is justified on principle and warranted in practice.

22.
23.
24.

Id. at 422, 334 N.W.2d at 70.
Id.
Id.
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II. THE WISCONSIN APPROACH TO INVERSE CONDEMNATION

Unlike many other states, 25 yet like the Federal government, 26
Wisconsin is a "taking" state. 2 7 This means that, unlike those states
whose constitutions provide for compensation for a "taking or damaging" of property, just compensation is due in Wisconsin only
when a "taking" occurs. Consequently, in those instances in which
an owner claims that governmental activities has so affected the use
and value of his or her private property as to have, in effect, constituted a "taking," courts must determine whether such activity may
be characterized as the legal equivalent of the formal exercise of the
power of eminent domain. However, while a formal de iure taking
can usually be easily identified by its procedural characteristics, 28 a
claim of de facto taking, for which an owner seeks the remedy of inverse condemnation, presents the difficult constitutional problem of
whether a "taking" has actually occurred and, if so, exactly when it
occurred. To further complicate the problem, courts traditionally
have distinguished between the power of eminent domain which,
when it is used, compels "just compensation," and the police power,
the excessive use of which, apparently, can be counteracted by a
granting of injunctive relief. 29 Assuming that the distinction between the two powers is always rational or justified, determining the
point at which the police power ends and eminent domain begins is
often difficult. 30 In general, the distinction between the two traditionally has lain in the fact that police power involves the public
regulation of property to prevent its use in a manner detrimental to
25. See supra note 9.
26. See supra note 8.
27. The Wisconsin Constitution provides: "[t]he Property of no person shall be
taken for public use without just compensation." WIS. CoNST. art. I,§ 13.
28. See WIS. STAT.§§ 32.01-.09 (1981-82). The procedure set forth in WIS. STAT.§
32.05 is for the use of condemnors acquiring property for "public alleys, streets, highways,
airports, mass-transit facilities, or other transportation facilities, or storm sewers and sanitary sewers or watercourses." I d. Condemnations for all other purposes are carried out under
the procedures set forth in WIS. STAT.§ 32.06. For a description of the various steps involved
in the process of acquiring title under these two procedures and related matters, see B.
SOUTHWICK, 6 WISCONSIN PROPERTY LAW SERIES (1981).
29. See generally Costonis, "Fair" Compensation and the Accommodation Power: Antidotes for the Taking Impasse in Land Use Controversies, 75 COLUM. L. REv. 1021 (1973); Sax,
Takings and the Police Power, 74 YALE L.J. 36 (1964); Stoebuck, Police Power, Takings and
Due Process, 37 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1057 (1980).
30. The difference between the eminent domain and police power is a matter of degree and not of kind. Just v. Marinette County, 56 Wis. 2d 7, 15, 201 N.W.2d 761. 767 (1972).
"The general rule at least is, that while property may be regulated to a certain extent, if
regulation goes too far it will be recognized as a taking." Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon,
260 U.S. 393, 415 (1922). See also infra notes 173-78 and accompanying text.
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the public interest, whereas eminent domain involves the acquisition of possessory or other legal rights in property for public use. 31
Since Wisconsin is a taking state, judicial determination of inverse condemnation claims is based on a construction of the eminent
domain clause of its constitution. 32 This is true even when an inverse condemnation action is based on the claim that the condemnor
has refused to exercise its power of eminent domain and pay compensation despite the fact that it is "occupying" the plaintiff's property within the meaning of Wisconsin Statute section 32.10. 33 Although the standard of proof required under both provisions is the
same, 34 under sec. 32.10 possession by the defendant of the power of
eminent domain is a prerequisite to maintaining an action in inverse
condemnation. 35
In the circumstances of Zinn v. State, 36 the DNR did not have
the power of condemnation nor the intention to condemn the plaintiff's property. 37 Nevertheless, the supreme court analyzed and decided the case according to the usual test applicable to an inverse
condemnation claim. In the process, the court clarified some of the
ambiguities surrounding taking jurisprudence in Wisconsin.
31. 1 NICHOl..'>', supra note 10, at§ 1.42, 1-127.
32. See Mandelker, Inverse Condemnation: The Limits of Public Responsibility, 1966
WIS. L. REV. 340-43.
33. WIS. STAT.§ 32.10 (1981-82) provides:
If any property has been occupied by a person possessing the power of condemnation
and if the person has not exercised the power, the owner, to institute condemnation
proceedings, shall present a verified petition to the circuit judge of the county
wherein the land is situated asking that such proceedings be commenced. The petition shall describe the land, state the person against which the proceedings are instituted and the use to which it has been put or is designed to have been put by the
person against which the proceedings are instituted. A copy of the petition shall be
served upon the person who has occupied petitioner's land, or interest in land. The
petition shall be filed in the office of the clerk of the circuit court . . . If the Court
determines that the defendant is occupying such property of the plaintiff without
having the right to do so, it shall treat the matter in accordance with the provisions
of [Chap. 32] assuming the plaintiff has received from the defendant a jurisdictional
offer and has failed to accept the same and assuming the plaintiff is not questioning
the right of the defendant to condemn the property so occupied.
34. Proof that there has been an "occupation" within the meaning of WIS. STAT.§
32.10, and a "taking" under Wis. CONST. art. I,§ 13 are functionally and legally equivalent.
See Howell Plaza, Inc. v. State Highway Comm'n, 66 Wis. 2d 720,723,226 N.W.2d 185, 18687 (1975) (Howell Plaza I); Maxey v. Redevelopment Authority of Racine, 94 Wis. 2d 375,
388,288 N.W.2d 794,800 (1980). The reason for the legal equivalence of the two terms is that
"occupation," itself under§ 32.10 is based on a construction of the eminent domain clause. See
Howell Plaza I, 66 Wis.2d at 723, 226 N.W. at 186-87 (1975).
35. The agencies or persons who may effect a "taking" under§ 32.10 are specifically
enumerated in the statute itself.
36. 112 Wis. 2d 417, 334 N.W.2d 67 (1983).
37. See infra notes 148-60 and accompanying text.

Zinn v. State
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A. The Wisconsin Test of What Constitutes "Taking"

The test for what constitutes a "taking" under Wisconsin law
traditionally has been rather restrictive. This restrictive test is not
solely explained by the fact that Wisconsin is a "taking" state (i.e.
Wisconsin requires proof of a taking to justify compensation), unlike those states whose constitutions allow recovery for a "taking or
damaging." Other taking states have construed their eminent domain provisions to permit a liberal approach to recovery. 38
1.

PHYSICAL INVASION

In the past, the sole test for taking in Wisconsin required a
showing that the government had actually physically occupied or
possessed the plaintiff's property. Thus, in one of the first cases construing an earlier inverse condemnation statute, the Wisconsin
Supreme Court held that "it is only where those authorized to exercise the power of eminent domain are actually in possession of or
enjoying the use of [plaintiff's) property . . . that the owner will be
entitled to sue in inverse condemnation." 39 This rather strict test
had been previously articulated by the United States Supreme
Court in Pumpelly v. Green Bay Co., 40 where the State of Wisconsin
had authorized the construction of a dam which caused the flooding
of plaintiff's land. 41 Essential to the physical invasion test is the
38. For example, although Michigan is a taking state, its courts have interpreted
that term liberally. "[T]he term 'taking' shall not be used in an unreasonable or narrow sense
. . . [I]t should include cases where the value [of property] is destroyed by the action of the
government, or serious injury is inflicted to the property itself, or exclusion of the owner from
its enjoyment, or from any appentenances thereto." Thorn v. State Highway Comm'r, 376
Mich. 608, 613, 138 N.W.2d 322, 323 (1965) (quoting Pearsall v. Board of Supervisors, 74
Mich. 558, 42 N.W. 77 (1889)) (road closing case). Thus, even damaging of property constitutes a taking under the Michigan approach. I d. at 562,42 N.W. at 78. For a discussion of the
liberality of this approach compared to the restrictiveness of the New York approach, see
Note, De Facto Taking and the Pursuit of Just Compensation, 48 FORD. L. REV. 334, 346-68
(1979). See also Washington Market Enterprises v. City of Trenton, 68 N.J.107, 343 A.2d 408
(1975).
39. Muscoda Bridge Co. v. Worden-Allen Co., 196 Wis. 76, 88, 219 N.W. 428, 433
(1928). In Muscoda, the court was construing an inverse condemnation statute similar to WIS.
STAT.§ 32.10, supra note 33. However, it held that a taking occurs only when the governmental entity actually physically possesses or occupies the plaintiff's property. The Court thereby
implied that nothing the entity does outside the boundaries of the property, however severe,
may constitute a taking. Obviously, this is in sharp contrast to the Michigan approach, supra
note 38.
40. 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 166 (1871).
41. In Pumpelly, id. the U.S. Supreme Court equated the effect of the backtlow of
water from the dam with taking (even though there was no formal act of appropriation by the
defendant company) and found the defendant inversely liable for, in effect, destroying the
plaintiff's property. Id. For an analysis of this case, see Mandelker, supra note 32, at 40-41.
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finding that "the public or its agents have physically used or occupied something belonging to the claimant." 42 Thus, under this test
governmental activity which does not result in physical possession,
interference or occupation does not constitute a taking regardless of
the fact that the governmental activity has deprived the plaintiff of
all the beneficial use of his property.
In much of the litigation that raises the taking issue, as in the
field of zoning, the physical invasion test is of little value since there
is no interference with property rights in a physical or possessory
sense. Nevertheless, the United States Supreme Court has recently
indicated that "a 'taking' may more readily be found when the interference can be characterized as a physical invasion by
government.'' 43
Even where physical interference with property rights has occurred, recovery under an inverse liability theory in Wisconsin is
anything but certain. Under Wisconsin property law, governmental
activity which "merely causes damage" is noncompensable when
the damage is deemed to be "indirect" or "consequential" and
therefore damnum absque injuria. 44 Although what is regarded as
indirect or consequential damage is uncertain, "[t]he distinction
seems to be between less and more remote damage and, in the last
analysis, seems to be purely a matter of degree." 45 In general, the
term damnum absque injuria refers to damage to property when no
part of it is taken by the government. 46 In spite of the fact that
there is no bright line distinguishing between governmental actions
merely causing consequential damage and those resulting in a compensable taking, the Wisconsin Supreme Court has steadfastly held
to that distinction. 4 7 This rather conservative approach adopted by
the court has substantially limited the basis of recovery for inverse
liability. This limitation may be illustrated by two cases decided
nearly two decades apart.
42. Michelman, Property, Utility, and Fairness: Comments on the Ethical Foundations of "Just Compensation" Law, 80 HARV. L. REV. 1165, 1184 (1965).
43. Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978). The Court
stated, however, that it was not "embrac[ing] the proposition that a 'taking' can never occur .
unless government has transferred physical control over a portion of a parcel." I d. at 123 n.25.
44. 2A NICHOLS', supra note 10, at§ 6.31, 6-210. See also More-Way North Corp. v.
State Highway Comm'n, 44 Wis. 2d 165, 173, 170 N.W.2d 749,753 (1969) (citing 2 NICHOLS',
supra note 10, at§ 6.4432(1), 6-503) (change of grade resulting in loss of 42 parking stalls
constituted consequential damage not a "taking"); Randall v. Milwaukee, 212 Wis. 374, 383,
249 N.W. 73, 76 (1933) (obstruction of egress and ingress merely consequential damage and
not a "taking").
45. 2A NICHOLS', supra note 10, at§ 6.31, 6-210.
46. Id.
47. See infra notes 48-50 and accompanying text.
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In Wisconsin Power & Light Co. v. Columbia County, 48 the
plaintiff alleged that its tower was taken when the defendant
county, in the course of relocating a trunk highway, deposited a
large amount of sand and gravel near the plaintiff's power line. The
sand and gravel sank into the swamp and the plaintiff's tower was
twisted and bent and thereby rendered useless. 49 The court determined that this was a case of mere consequential damage, not a taking, and therefore denied recovery. In so concluding, it found:
[T]hat the tower had no utility, direct or indirect, to the highway
project, that the county did not need or desire the tower or the land on
which it rested and did not intend to acquire or affect either the tower or
the land, that the public obtained no benefit from injuring it, that the
county had no reason to anticipate that damage would result from its
acts, and that the injury to the tower was purely accidental. 50

Strictly applied, this opinion would deny almost all inverse liability
and erect a rule of absolute immunity for all consequential damage
caused by governmental action. 51 From the point of view of the
owner, the lack of intention on the part of the defendant county to
injure the property interest of the plaintiff is irrelevant. Yet the
Columbia County court found the absence of "need or desire" signifi48. 3 Wis. 2d 1, 87 N.W.2d 279 (1958).
49. Id. at 3, 87 N.W.2d at 280.
50. Id. at 7, 87 N.W.2d at 282. The court appears to be drawing a line between
governmental action which amounts to a tort and one which is a taking, leaving open the
question of whether the aggrieved party may recover under a tort theory, when it states that
"the County may or may not be liable in tort depending on such factors as negligence and
sovereign immunity; but plaintiff's property is not taken for public use within the meaning of
Sec. 13, art. 1, Wis. Const."
51. See Mandelker, supra note 32, at 45. The view expressed in Columbia County,
was affirmed in Hoene v. City of Milwaukee, 17 Wis. 2d 209, 116 N.W.2d 112 (1962) where
plaintiffs sued for damages to their house which allegedly resulted from heavy traffic on an
adjacent highway. They claimed that the city's failure to construct and repair the highway
was responsible for the damage. In denying inverse recovery the court stated: "[c]ertainly the
appellants' property was not 'taken' for public use in the usual sense of the word. Neither title
nor possession was appropriated by the city. The appellants' property was not needed by the
city to operate its street. This court has previously stated that 'mere consequential damage to
property resulting from governmental action is not a taking thereof"' (citing Wisconsin
Power & Light Co. v. Columbia County, 3 Wis. 2d at 6, 87 N.W.2d at 281). Hoene,17 Wis. 2d
at 217, 116 N.W.2d at 116. But see Luber v. Milwaukee County, 47 Wis. 2d 271,177 N.W.2d
380, (1970) which has modified the harshness of the rule regarding consequential damages. In
Luber, the court held that rental loss suffered by a condemnee in connection with a taking of
his property is an "interest" requiring compensation, and is therefore not mere consequential
damage. The court stated that, "[t]he rule making consequential damages damnun absque
injuria is under modern constitutional interpretation, discarded and sec. 32.19( 4) insofar as it
limits compensation is invalid." Id. at 283, 177 N.W.2d at 386.
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cant in absolving the defendant of liability under an inverse condemnation theory. 52
In Public Service Corporation v. Marathon County, 53 the court
did allow recovery under an inverse liability theory, finding a "taking." In that case, the defendant county had ordered the plaintiff to
remove its utility lines along a town road and relocate them underground so that the county could build an additional airport runway.
The court noted initially that even this arguably clearer case
presented a borderline situation. 54 However, it found that the
county's intention to take the plaintiff's easement and the benefit the
public derived from the enlargement of the airport tipped the balance in favor of finding a "taking." 55
The role of acquisitory intention has never been clear. The
court in Marathon County did not explicitly proclaim that acquisitory intent or public use is the standard by, which a "taking" is to be
distinguished from "mere consequential damage." Nevertheless, the
weight it assigned to both factors distinguishes this case from
Columbia County. Indeed, there is language in the federal cases suggesting that the "weight of authority [in this country is] . . . that in
order to constitute a taking, the condemnor must have an intention
to appropriate . . . . " 56
Yet in Zinn v. State, 5 7 the court appears to have moved away
from the above line of cases to bolster the position of claimants in
inverse liability. In Zinn, the court rejected as irrelevant the State's
contention that the DNR had no intention to take private property.
In declaring that intention has no place in taking jurisprudence, the
court quoted approvingly from Justice Brennan's dissenting opinion
in' San Diego Gas & Electric Co. v. City of San Diego: 5 8 "the Constitu52. 3 Wis. 2d at 7, 87 N.W.2d at 282.
53. 75 Wis. 2d 442, 249 N.W.2d 543 (1977).
54. I d. at 449,249 N.W.2d at 546. The court viewed the case as presenting a borderline situation between taking and mere consequential damage resulting from the exercise of
the police power. The fact that the utility retained its interest in the property, the court reasoned, could be viewed as mere police power regulation of the location of power lines. Yet, the
court found the fact that the forced removal of the utility was useful to the public sufficient to
make the exercise more like a taking than a police power regulation. I d.
55. Id. at 448, 249 N.W.2d at 545.
56. Porter v. United States, 473 F.2d 1329, 1336 (5th Cir. 1973); accord, J.J. Henry
Co. v. United States, 441 F.2d 1246 (1969). See also B. Amusement Co. v. United States, 180
F. Supp. 386 (1960); Sayre v. United States, 282 F. Supp.175 (N.D. Ohio, 1967). But see San
Diego Gas & Elect. Co. v. City of San Diego, 450 U.S. 621, 652-53 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
57. 112 Wis. 2d 417, 334 N.W.2d 67.
58. 450 U.S. 621, 632 (1960). Although the majority in San Diego determined that
there was no "final judgment" and therefore refused to reach the merits, four Justices dissented and found a taking and a fifth Justice stated he would have agreed with the dissenters if
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tion measures a taking of property not by what a state says, or what
it intends, but by what it does." 59
2.

LEGAL RESTRICTION AND SUBSTANTIAL DEPRIVATION

Conscious of the restrictive nature of the physical invasion test,
the Wisconsin Supreme Court recently has modified the physical invasion test to temper its harshness. 60 Under the new test, the plaintiff need not prove that his property has been physically invaded. It
is enough that the defendant has placed upon the plaintiff's property
a restriction which "practically or substantially renders [the property] useless for all reasonable purposes." 61
Although the current test was apparently first announced in the
context of litigation involving zoning, 62 its meaning in the context
of inverse condemnation proceedings was tested in Howell Plaza,
Inc. v. State Highway Commission (Howell Plaza 1). 63 This case
raised the issue of inverse condemnation for a de facto taking which
allegedly occurred by reason of the threat of condemnation. 64 The
there had been a final judgment. Thus, if the Court had reached the merits, it. would have
·found a taking. See infra note 189.
59. San Diego, 450 U.S. at 652-53 (quoting Hughes v. Washington, 389 U.S. 290, 298
(1967) (Stewart, J., concurring)).
·
60. See Howell Plaza, Inc. v. State Highway Comm'n, 92 Wis. 2d 74, 284 N.W.2d
887 (1979) (Howell Plaza II).
61. Buhler v. Racine County, 33 Wis. 2d 137, 143, 146 N.W.2d 403,406 (1966) (zoning). See also Just v. Marinette County, 56 Wis. 2d 7, 15,201 N.W.2d 761,767 (1972) (zoning
of wetlands).
62. Buhler v. Racine County, 33 Wis. 2d 137, 146 N.W.2d 403 (1966).
63. 66 Wis. 2d 720, 226 N.W.2d 185 (1975).
64. The term "condemnation blight" has been coined to denote "the debilitating
effect upon value of a threatened, imminent or potential condemnation." 4 NICHOLS', supra
note 10, at§ 12.3151[5], 12-475. Condemnation blight occurs when:
[t]he advance planning necessary for public improvements . . . results in postponements and delays in condemnation proceedings. Long periods of time lapse between
the initiation of a project and the actual award of compensation to the property
owner. As this delay continues, property values in the area set off for the public improvement sometimes rapidly depreciate, because the tenants relocate in other areas
and property owners are reluctant to spend money on repairs. There can be a substantial loss of financial return from such property, while the cost of maintenance
continues. . . . The law of eminent domain has found this a difficult problem to resolve.
Howell Plaza I, 66 Wis. 2d at 727-28,226 N.W.2d at 189 (quoting the trial court). The crucial
issue in cases raising the condemnation blight problem is whether the conduct or activity of a
condemning authority constitutes a de facto taking or merely condemnation blight. If the former, compensation is awarded as of the date the condemnor somehow interfered with the
owner's enjoyment of his property, regardless of when title vested in the condemnor. Thus the
date of taking is moved forward to coincide with the actual taking even though formal or legal
taking occurs later. Under the condemnation blight concept, on the other hand, the date of
taking remains the same, but the owner is compensated for the loss of value to his property as
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plaintiff in Howell Plaza I alleged that the pre-condemnation activities of the defendant constituted a de facto taking. It alleged that the
defendant had sent notices to tenants and property owners in the
area informing them of the imminence of condemnation and that the
City of Oak Creek, at the "insistence" of the defendant, had urged
the plaintiff to withhold development of its land because of the upcoming condemnation for the purpose of building the freeway system. Further, the defendant allegedly had advised the plaintiff that
its property might be acquired and that it had informally approved
acquisition of the plaintiff's property. 65 As a result of these activities, the plaintiff argued that it was unable to develop its land and
attract tenants to its property. 66 Moreover, the plaintiff claimed
that the city planning office had informed it that the city would not
grant a building permit due to the freeway project. 67
The trial court found the complaint sufficient to constitute a
claim for a de facto taking. 68 It reasoned that the long periods of time
between the announcement of public improvements and the actual
commencement of condemnation proceedings often result in substantial hardship and unfairness to property owners. 69
On appeal, the supreme court found the trial court's reasoning
"highly persuasive." 70 Nevertheless, concerned that inverse condemnation in these circumstances would in effect transfer property
to an unwilling buyer which had not yet exercised its legislative
function of deciding whether to condemn the property, the court
held that in order to state a cause of action under section 32.10 of the
Wisconsin Statutes, the property owner must allege facts in its complaint that it had been "deprived of all, or substantially all, of the
beneficial use of [his] property or of any part thereof.'' 7 1
The court's opinion in Howell Plaza I left unclear the elements
of the substantial deprivation test. First, while the opinion suga result of the condemnor's value-depressing acts. 4 NICHOLS', supra note 10, at§ 12.3151[5),
12-475.
65. Howell Plaza II, 92 Wis. 2d 74, 97, 284 N.W.2d at 888 (1979).
66. Id.
67. Howell Plaza I, 66 Wis. 2d at 722, 226 N.W.2d at 186.
68. Id.
69. See supra note 64.
70. See Howell Plaza I, 66 Wis. 2d at 727, 226 N.W.2d at 189, where the court indicates that it agrees with the trial judge's concern that "there may be a fundamental unfairness
in permitting a public agency to deal with property owners in such a way that they cannot
make the optimum and normal use of their property. . . . "
71. I d. at 730,226 N.W.2d at 190. In so holding the court stated, "we conclude that
there need not be an actual taking in the sense that there be a physical occupation or possession by the condemning authority, and to that extent we modify the rule stated in Muscoda

Bridge Co. v. Worden-Allen Co." Id.
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gested that a showing of substantial deprivation of beneficial use
alone, without a further showing of a legal restriction placed on the
use of the property, is not enough to constitute a taking, the actual
holding is not couched in such terms. Second, the opinion left vague
whether the inability of the property owner to develop his land only
for a temporary period is constitutionally significant. Finally, the
opinion was unclear as to whether a legal restriction must emanate
from an authority with the power to impose such a restriction.
The court, however, clarified these issues in Howell Plaza I I. 72
The Howell Plaza II court acknowledged the ambiguities in its first
opinion, noting that the test under Howell Plaza I was arguably
"broad enough to allow the finding of a 'taking' whenever a property
owner is unable to beneficially use his property, even where this is
only an indirect result of governmental action." 73 Thus, in order to
narrow the test, it adopted two further requirements. First, "[a] taking can occur absent physical invasion only where there is a legally
imposed restriction upon the property's use." 74 Second, the legal restraint must issue from an authority with the power to do so. 75
Under this test, the outcome of Howell Plaza II was almost a
foregone conclusion. Since the Highway Commission neither imposed any legal restriction upon the plaintiff's property, nor had the
authority to do so, short of actually condemning the property, the
court found two major elements of the test unsatisfied. The court
noted that in many jurisdictions in the country "the mere plotting
or planning of a public improvement" does not constitute a de facto
taking. 76
It is important to understand the requirement that a restriction
must issue from an agency with the legal authority. As long as the
condemnor issues no restriction there will be no taking despite the
72. 92 Wis. 2d at 87, 284 N.W.2d at 893.
73. I d. In other words, the court treated the appellant's loss as "mere consequential
damage." The New York Court of Appeals had previously adopted a similar test in City of
Buffalo v. J.W. Clement Co., Inc., 28 N.Y.2d 241,269 N.E.2d 895,321 N.Y.S.2d 345 (1971),
where it declared that" . . . a de facto taking requires a physical entry by the condemnor, a
physical ouster of the owner, a legal interference with the physical use, possession or enjoyment of the property or a legal interference with the owner's power of disposition of the property." I d. at 255, 269 N.E.2d at 903, 321 N.Y.S.2d at 357. For a criticism of the Clement rule
see Note, supra note 38. Under a somewhat similar situation the New Jersey Supreme Court
has granted recovery. See Washington Market Enterprises v. City of Trenton, 68 N.J. 107,
343 A.2d 408 (1975).
74. Howell Plaza II, 92 Wis. 2d at 88, 284 N.W.2d at 893.
75. Id. at 86, 88, 284 N.W.2d at 893.
76. I d. at82, 284N.W.2dat 891. See 37 A.L.R.3d 127,132 (1971). But see Washington Market Enterprises v. City of Trenton, 68 N.J. 107, 343 A.2d 408 (1975); Klopping v.
City of Whittier, 8 Cal.3d 39, 500 P.2d 1345, 104 Cal. Rptr. 1 (1972).
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debilitating effects of its activity and its intention to condemn an
owner's property. Thus, in Howell Plaza II, even though the court
found that the city planner had informed the plaintiff that its application for a building permit would be denied, 77 the court held that
this amounted to no restriction because the city planner had no legal
authority to restrain the plaintiff from developing its land. Likewise,
even though the Commission had informally approved the acquisition of plaintiff's property as a "hardship" case and had appointed
appraisers for that purpose, 78 the court concluded that these activities were insufficient to constitute a restriction. 79

B. Application of the Taking Test to

ZINN

v.

STATE

Zinn presented the Wisconsin Supreme Court with a major opportunity to clarify the meaning of Howell Plaza I I, albeit in a most
unusual context. Specifically, Zinn provided the court with an occasion to apply the Howell Plaza I I test in a non-condemnation, nonzoning, quasi-judicial context, and to determine what type of governmental interference with property is sufficient to constitute a
compensable taking, and at what point a governmental action may
be said to have effected a taking. In Zinn, the court was confronted
with the difficulty of fitting the unusual facts of that case into the
requirement of "restriction," as enunciated in Howell Plaza II, and
the uncertainty regarding the compensability of a temporary inability to develop one's land as a result of governmental action left unclear in Howell Plaza II. In order to better demonstrate the difficulty of applying the Howell Plaza I I test to contexts other than its
own, it is necessary at this point to set forth in some detail the facts
of Zinn.
1. THE FACTS OF

ZINN

Rose Zinn was the owner of a parcel of land which completely
surrounded McConville Lake in Washington County. 80 She thus
had sole riparian rights to the lake. In January, 1976, a neighbor of
Zinn filed a petition for a declaratory ruling with the Wisconsin Department of Natural Resources (DNR) to obtain a determination of
the ordinary highwater mark (OHWM) of the lake. 81 Accordingly,
77. Howell Plaza II, 92 Wis. 2d at 84, 284 N.W.2d at 891.
78. Id. at 78, 284 N.W.2d at 888.
79. Id. at 86, 284 N.W.2d at 893.
80. Zinn, 112 Wis. 2d at 420, 334 N.W.2d at 69.
81. I d. at 420-21, 334 N.W.2d at 69.
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on June 13, 1977 the DNR held a hearing on the petition. At the
hearing, the hearing examiner received in evidence the testimony of
a DNR employee as to the location of the OHWM. 82 Based on the
record thus developed, the hearing examiner issued a ruling on July
22, 1977, placing the OHWM of the lake at an elevation correspond-.
ing to Contour 990 on the United States Geological Survey. 83
As a result of the ruling, the surface of the lake increased from
about fourteen acres to more than nineteen-hundred acres. 84 Zinn's
two-hundred acres of dry land now became part of the lake bed. The
ruling also meant that abutting property owners, including Zinn's
neighbor, would have riparian rights which had belonged solely to
Zinn. 85
Faced with losing her land and her sole riparian ownership,
Zinn petitioned for a rehearing. 86 The DNR granted the petition on
August 29, 1977. Almost two years later, on March 14, 1979, the
hearing examiner issued a new ruling; rescinding his previous order.87 The new ruling established the OHWM at Contour 980.3
(mean sea level datum) as it always had been. 88
Zinn commenced a suit in inverse condemnation seeking damages against the State of Wisconsin alleging an unconstitutional taking of her property in that the State of Wisconsin deprived her of
"all or substantially all the beneficial use" of her property including
the right to convey the same or to develop it during the period of the
taking. 89 The State moved to dismiss on several grounds including
failure to state a claim and the doctrine of sovereign immunity. The
trial court denied the motion and the State appealed. The court of
appeals reversed, holding that Zinn failed to state facts sufficient to
constitute a taking. The supreme court, however, reversed the appellate court and held that the DNR's original ruling constituted a
taking.

82. Id. at 421, 334 N.W.2d at 69.
83. Id.
84. I d. See also, Respondent-Petitioner's brief at 3, I d.
85. See infra notes 102-03 and accompanying text.
86. Zinn, 112 Wis. 2d at 421, 334 N.W.2d at 69.
87. Jd.
88. Id.
89. Id. at 421-22, 334 N.W.2d at 69-70. See Respondent-Petitioners brief at 10-11,

I d.
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2.

WHAT CONSTITUTED A TAKING IN ZINN

In holding that Zinn failed to state a claim, the court of appeals
relied on language in Howell Plaza I J9° that a temporary inability to
develop one's property as a result of governmental action is insufficient to constitute a taking. 91 The court reasoned that since the
granting of the petit,ion for rehearing (one month after the original
DNR ruling) nullified whatever effects the original ruling might
have had, the erroneous determination was for such a brief period
that it could not constitute a taking. 92 More importantly, the court
found that the pleadings failed to show any "restriction" that the
State placed upon the property either as a result of the original ruling or at anytime thereafter. 93 Finally, the court pointed out that
once a rehearing was granted, the DNR would have had no legal
authority to restrain development even if it sought to do so. 94
In reversing, the Wisconsin Supreme Court approached Zinn's
taking claim differently. At the outset, the court identified the issue
to be whether an erroneous administrative decision by the DNR can
ever result in a taking. 95 The court found the resolution of the issue
to be a function of three basic determinations. The first involved
whether the DNR had the authority to make the declaratory ruling
which might effect a taking. 96 In order to find a basis for that authority, the court turned to the nature of a DNR administrative
proceeding. It found that the DNR is authorized by law to make
determinations concerning the location of the OHWM of navigable
lakes and streams. 97 Further, the court found that the DNR has the
90. 92 Wis. 2d 74,284 N.W.2d 887 (1979) discussed supra notes 72-76andaccompanying text.
91. Zinn v. State (Wis. Ct. App. Dist. II, 1982) (unpublished opinion) reprinted in
Respondent-Petitioner's brief, at App. 114, 117-18, Id.
92. Id. at App. 119.
93. Id.
94. Id.
95. Zinn, 112 Wis. 2d at 424, 334 N.W.2d at 71.
96. Id.
97. !d. at 429, 334 N.W.2d at 71 (citing WIS. STAT.§ 30.10(1), (4)(b) (1981-82).
Section 30.10 entitled Declarations of navigability provides in pertinent part:
(1) Lakes: All lakes wholly or partly within this state which are navigable in fact are
declared to be navigable and public waters, and all persons have the same rights
therein and thereto as they have in and to any other navigable or public waters.
(4) Interpretation . ..

(b) The boundaries of lands adjoining waters and the rights of the state and of individuals with respect to all such lands and waters shall be determined in conformity
with the common law so far as applicable, but in the case of a lake or stream erroneously meandered in the original U.S. government survey, the owner of title to lands
adjoining the meandered lake or stream, as shown on such original survey, is conclusively presumed to own to the actual shore lines unless it is first established in a suit
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authority to make binding declaratory rulings. 98 Since the DNR determined the OHWM of McConville Lake and issued a binding declaratory ruling pursuant to law, the court held that the DNR did
have the requisite authority to issue a legal restriction on the plaintiff's use of property. 99
Second, the court had to determine whether the DNR ruling in
Zinn amounted to a legal restriction. It found that, prior to the
DNR ruling, the ordinary highwater mark of the lake had been at
contour 980.3. 100 After the original ruling, the mark was placed at
contour 990, which in effect placed about two-hundred acres of
plaintiff's dry land within the highwater mark of the lake. 101 Under
Wisconsin law, all land below the ordinary highwater mark is titled
to the State of Wisconsin. 102 This meant that Zinn lost her sole riparian rights, and her shoreland became open to public use under the
"trust doctrine." 103 Therefore, the court concluded that the failure
of the plaintiff specifically to allege "actual restriction on the use of
[her] land as a result of the ruling" was not fatal to her claim. 104
Finally, the court had to determine whether the DNR's lack of
"intent and authority" to take private property under the circumstances of the Zinn case could preclude a taking. Finding intent to
be legally insignificant, the court found the "effect" of the DNR's
action and the "impact" of that action upon the plaintiff determinative.105 For the court, it was sufficient that the legal effect of the
in equity, brought by the U.S. government for that purpose, that the government
was in fact defrauded by such survey. If the proper claims of adjacent owners of
riparian lots of lands between meander and actual shore lines conflict, each shall have
its proportion of such shore lands.
In Wisconsin, "[w]hen it is said that a water is navigable it is merely a different way of saying
that it is public-public not only for navigation, but for hunting, fishing, recreation and for
any other lawful purpose." Muench v. Public Service Comm'n, 261 Wis. 429,506,53 N.W.2d
514, 519 (1952) (quoting Kanneberg, Wisconsin Law of Waters 1946 Wis. L. REV. 345, 347).
This access to public waters is known as the "public trust doctrine."
98. Zinn, 112 Wis. 2d at 425-26, 334 N.W.2d 71-72 (citing WIS. STAT. § 227.06
(1981-82)). Section 227.06 provides in relevant part:
(1) Any agency may, on petition by any interested person, issue a declaratory ruling
with respect to the applicability to any person, property or state of facts of any rule
or statute enforced by it. . . . A declaratory ruling shall bind the agency all parties
to the proceedings on the statement of facts alleged. . . .
99. Zinn, 112 Wis. 2d at 426-27, 334 N.W.2d at 72.
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. Muench v. Public Service Comm'n, 261 Wis. 492,53 N.W.2d 514,55 N.W.2d 40
(1952); Doemel v. Jantz, 180 Wis. 225, 193 N.W. 393 (1923).
103. Zinn, 112, Wis. 2d at 426, 334 N.W.2d at 71.
104. Id. at 427, 334 N.W.2d at 72.
105. I d. at 430, 334 N.W.2d at 73. Similarly, with regard to the DNR's authority to
take private property, the court found that its authority to issue a legally binding ruling
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DNR's decision was to vest title to two-hundred acres of Zinn's
property in the State regardless of what the State said about its
action. 106
While the force of the logic of the Zinn court to find a taking is
considerable, the State and court of appeal's position concerning the
import of "legal restriction" is understandable. The notion of legal
restriction implies t,hat the defendant must have prevented the plaintiff from developing her land. In Zinn, however, the State contended
that the DNR ruling, though erroneous, applied to and was binding
upon the parties only as to matters within the jurisdiction of the
DNR. 107 To be sure, the DNR had jurisdiction to determine the
location of the OHWM of the lake but not to determine title between parties 108 -a power reserved only to the courts. Nevertheless, the role the supreme court gave to the effect of the DNR decision in Zinn determined the outcome of the case. Thus, even though
it is unlikely that Zinn could have been legally prevented from developing her land, on the basis of the DNR ruling alone, the ruling
would have been sufficient legal authority to authorize Zinn's neighbors to obtain permits to build structures, 109 piers, 110 docks and to
ca~ry on dredging 111 on her shoreline.
3.

OFFICIAL IMMUNITY AND THE TEMPORARINESS OF THE TAKING

Zinn establishes that the immunity of officials when acting in a
quasi-judicial context does not preclude the finding of a taking. Zinn
raises the important question of whether, as a matter of policy, a
taking should be found in a quasi-judicial context. The State contended that since decisions by administrative agencies are made objectively on the basis of the records before them and the evidence
presented to them by the disputing parties, the State should not be
which had the effect of giving title to the State was sufficient authority to constitute a taking.
/d.

106. Id. In imposing such absolute liability, the court seems to have broken away
from its earlier position in Wisconsin Power & Light Co. v. Columbia County, 3 Wis. 2d 1, 87
N.W.2d 279 (1957) and Public Service Corporation v. Marathon County, 75 Wis. 2d 442,249
N.W.2d 543 (1977). See supra notes 48-56.
107. Zinn, 112 Wis. 2d at 426, 334 N.W.2d at 71.
108. Moreover, administrative agency decisions generally do not have res judicata
effect. Fond duLac v. Dept. of Natural Resources, 45 Wis.2d 620, 173 N.W.2d 605 (1970);
Board of Regents v. Wisconsin Personnel Comm'n, 103 Wis. 2d 545, 309 N.W.2d 366 (Ct.·
App. 1981). As such, Zinn would have been free to defend her title in court if the DNR laid
claim to title on the basis of its ruling.
109. W1s. STAT.§ 30.12 (1981-82).
110. WIS. STAT.§ 30.13 (1981-82).
111. WIS. STAT.§ 30.20 (1981-82).
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liable for erroneous determinations resulting from the insufficiency
of the record developed by the parties. 112 Moreover, the policy of
maintaining the integrity of the administrative adjudicatory process should preclude the finding of a taking. 113 In support of this
contention, the State relied on the decision of the United States
Supreme Court in Butz v. Economou. 114 That case involved the issue
of whether, to what extent, and what type of federal officials were
entitled to immunity from damage suits for constitutional violations in the discharge of their official duties. The Court found that
the need for immunity for federal officials varied with the nature of
their functions and with the safeguards built into the execution of
those functions to guard against unconstitutional acts. 115 Finding
that "adjudication within the federal administrative agency shares
enough of the characteristics of the judicial process" and further
finding that there exist a number of safeguards as a concommittant
of this process, the Court held that federal adjudicators should be
absolutely immune from damage suits. 116
The court in Zinn found the holding of Butz, and the rationale
upon which it rested, entirely inapposite to the State's contention
against the finding of a taking. The court correctly determined that
the issue in Zinn did not involve the civil immunity of the individual
examiner for engaging in a governmental action which resulted in a
taking even though it was done in good faith and non-negligently. 117
As the court reasoned, if the possible civil liability of the individual
official was to affect the outcome of a "taking" determination, surely
the same rationale could serve to preclude the finding of an unconstitutional taking under an ordinance or statute enacted by
legislators. 118
The court also found unpersuasive the State's contention that a
finding of a taking in this context would chill agency decision-making.119 The court determined that "[t]he applicability of express
constitutional guarantees is not a matter to be determined on the
basis of policy judgments made by the legislative, executive or judicial branches." 120 Moreover, since the notion of official immunity
112. Appellant's brief, at 14-15, Zinn.
113. Id.
114. 438 u.s. 478 (1978).
115. Id. at 512. These safeguards include insulation from political influence, precedent, the adversary nature of the process and the correctability of error on appeal. I d.
116. Id. at 512-13.
117. Zinn, 112 Wis. 2d at 430-31, 334 N.W.2d at 74.
118. Id.
119. Id.
120. Id.
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would appear to be designed precisely to prevent the chilling effect,
if any, of civil liability, the State's contention was misplaced.
Zinn also establishes that a taking is no less a taking because a
governmental entity's power to undo what it did tends to make the
taking temporary. Yet the court's previous statement in Howell
Plaza II that the plaintiff "had been unable to develop [sic] his land
only temporarily" 121 seems to give precisely that implication. Thus,
since the DNR ruling did not prevent Zinn from developing her
land, the State argued that the DNR's restraint on Zinn's property
was insufficient to constitute a taking and the court of appeals accepted this as one basis for dismissing Zinn's complaint for a failure
to state a claim. 122
While it is true that the significance of the Howell Plaza II
court's reference to the temporariness of the alleged taking is unclear and can be misleading, the brevity of the alleged taking was
certainly not the basis of the outcome of the decision. 123 Even if it
could be argued that this decision rested on the temporariness of the
injury, however, the court's holding in Zinn has swept away this
aspect of the Howell Plaza II decision. Even though the Zinn court
found it clear that the taking was only temporary, because the DNR
had later rescinded its original ruling, it quoted the opinion of Justice Brennan in San Diego Gas & Electric v. City of San Diego 124 for
the broad proposition that the temporary or permanent nature of a
taking, regardless of its context, is irrelevant to the issue of whether
a governmental action has effected a taking. Quoting from that
opinion, the court stated:
The fact that a regulatory "taking" may be temporary, by virtue of the
government's power to rescind or amend the regulation, does not make
it any less of a constitutional "taking." . . . This Court more than once
has recognized that temporary reversible "takings" should be analysed
according to the same constitutional framework applied to permanent
irreversible "takings." 12 5

The predicate of the court's agreement with this opinion was its determination that the test for a reversible taking in Wisconsin is the
121. See Howell Plaza II, 92 Wis.2d 74, 86, 284 N.W.2d 887, 893 (1979).
122. Zinn, 112 Wis. 2d at 427, 334 N.W.2d at 72.
123. Even though the court in Howell Plaza II had stated "[a]t most, petitioner has
been unable to develop his land only temporarily," its decision rested "[m]ore importantly [on
the fact] that the commission did not impose any such legal restraint upon petitioner or its
property." Howell Plaza II, 92 Wis. 2d at 86, 284 N.W.2d at 893.
124. 450 u.s. 621, 632.
125. Zinn, 112 Wis. 2d at 428-29, 334 N.W.2d at 73 (quoting San Diego, 450 U.S. at
657 (Brennan, J., dissenting)).
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same as for an irreversible taking: the substantiality of the property
owner's loss of beneficial use of her property regardless of the length
of period during which she suffered such loss. 126 In other words, it is
the quantum of harm and its impact upon the property owner rather
than the length of time within which the harm occurred that is determinative to the taking issue. And as the court reasoned, the fact
that a plaintiff regains the full use of his property by reason of the
government's decision to change its position is irrelevant to the taking issue. 127 The court pointed out, however, that the length of the
taking period may be a factor in determining whether there was a
taking in the first place. 128 Implicit in this statement is the court's
recognition that the longer the period, the greater the harm and the
more likely that a taking will be found.
4.

WHEN DID THE TAKING OCCUR IN ZINN?

Another significant aspect of the Zinn decision involves the
question of when a taking occurs. The significance of this question
should be apparent from the closing statements of the preceding Section. Because the length of period during which a taking allegedly
occurs is itself an important factor in determining whether a property owner suffered a substantial deprivation constituting a taking,
the point of time as of which a taking is reckoned affects the amount
of deprivation and therefore also affects the question of whether
there is a taking. Moreover, the point at which a taking occurs affects the amount of compensation because that point determines the
length of the period for which compensation must be paid. 129
In Zinn, the court of appeals determined that the DNR's granting of the plaintiff's petition for a rehearing suspended whatever effect the original ruling may have had. 130 Therefore, it found that
the original ruling was in effect only for slightly more than one
month. 131 The court based its conclusion on the provisions of section 227.12(2) of the Wisconsin Statutes. 132
126. Zinn, 112 Wis. 2d at 429, 284 N.W.2d at 73.
127. Id.
128. Id. at 427 n.5, 334 N.W.2d at 72 n.5.
129. Id.
130. Zinn v. State (Ct. App. Dist. II, 1982) (unpublished opinion) reprinted in Respondent-Petitioner's brief at App. 114, 118.
131. I d. at App. 119, Zinn.
132. WIS. STAT.§ 227.12(2) (1981-82) provides:
The filing of a petition for rehearing shall not suspend or delay the effective date of
the order, and the order shall take effect on the date fixed by the agency and shall
continue in effect unless the petition is granted or until the order is superseded, modified, or set aside as provided by law.
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The plaintiff's claim for compensation, on the other hand, was
for a much longer period. She alleged that the effect of the original
ruling on the use of her property remained until the DNR rescinded
its ruling more than a year and a half later. 133
The Wisconsin Supreme Court did not determine whether the
alleged taking remained in effect until the DNR made its second determination and rescinded its original ruling. 134 However, for purposes of ruling on Zinn's appeal, the court found it sufficient that
there was at least a temporary taking. 13 5 In reaching this result, the
court quoted the rule that Justice Brennan proposed in San Diego to
govern regulatory as well as other takings: 136
[O]nce a court establishes that there was a regulatory "taking," the Constitution demands that the government entity pay just compensation
for the period commencing on the date the regulation first effected the
"taking," and ending on the date the government entity chooses torescind or otherwise amend the regulation. 13 7

On the basis of this rule, the Zinn court held that Zinn lost title to
her property for one month as of the original ruling and had her title
clouded for the balance of the period ending on the date on which the
DNR rescinded its ruling. 138 This must mean that the date of legal
restriction in Zinn coincided with the date on which the DNR made
its original ruling. It must also mean that as of that date Zinn began
to suffer the impact of the legal restriction on her power to use her
property.
The Brennan rule which the Zinn court cited, however, is ambiguous. 139 In the context of a zoning regulation, for example, the
date on which a regulation "effects" a taking can be three points of
time: 1) the date on which the regulation is epacted; 2) the date on
which the owner is denied a variance or permit; and 3) the date on
which the regulation is actually enforced. Since the general rule is
that one must exhaust administrative remedies before bringing a
suit for a taking, 140 the mere enactment of a regulation cannot effect
a taking.
133. Zinn, 112 Wis. 2d at 427 n.5, 334 N.W.2d at 72 n.5.
134. I d. at 427-28 n.5, 334 N.W.2d at 72 n.5. The court remanded the factual determinations of the length of the taking and the damages flowing therefrom to the trial court. I d.
135. Id. at 427, 427 n.5, 334 N.W.2d at 72, 72 n.5.
136. Id. at 428, 334 N.W.2d at 72.
137. San Diego, 450 U.S. at 653-54.
138. Zinn, 112 Wis. 2d at 427 n.5, 334 N.W.2d at 72 n.5.
139. See supra note 125 and accompanying text.
140. Hagman, Temporary or Interim Damages Awards in Land Use Control Cases, 4
ZoNiNG & PLAN. L. REP. 129, 135 (1981). But see, Nodell lnv. Corp. v. Glendale, 78 Wis. 2d
416, 254 N.W.2d 310 (1977), where the Wisconsin Supreme Court recognized a "well-defined
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In the administrative context too, three points of time can be
relevant: 1) the date of an original ruling; 2) the date of rescission or
modification; and 3) the date of actual enforcement. Justice Abrahamson's concurring opinion in Zinn 141 seems to point up the significance of the ambiguity in Justice Brennan's rule as it relates to the
doctrine qf exhaustion of administrative remedies. 142 Justice Abrahamson reasoned that the fact that the DNR had the right to reconsider its original ruling and that it granted Zinn a rehearing may
mean that the DNR ruling was always subject to modification. This
inchoate quality of the ruling, the Justice continued, may therefore
never have given the ruling that degree of "finality" needed to effect
a taking. 143 Thus, the Justice concluded that, even though Zinn survived the motion to dismiss, the trial court may still determine that
under applicable law 144 the DNR's original ruling might never have
taken effect. 145 Justice Abrahamson's concurrence is consistent with
the general rule in eminent domain cases that the time of taking and
evaluation of the award stems from the date that a governmental
entity acquires effective dominion and control over the owner's
property and not from the announcement or enactment of an ordinance or plan. 146

Ill. WHAT REMEDY IS COMPELLED ONCE A "TAKING" IS FOUND?
In the past, the finding of a taking in Wisconsin did not necessarily compel the remedy of compensation or money damages. Two
questions have often surrounded this remedy. The first question is
distinction in applying this judicial policy [of exhaustion of remedies] to the statutory administrative remedies in zoning cases. . . . [A] challenge to the constitutional validity of a zoning
ordinance presents a question of law. Such a challenge may properly be made by commencing
an action for declaratory judgment and the doctrine of exhaustion of remedies is not applicable." Id. at 426, 254 N.W.2d at 316 (quoting Kmiec v. Town of Spider Lake, 60 Wis. 2d 640,
645, 211 N.W.2d 471, 473 (1973)). "The reason for this exception is that an appeal to an
administrative agency would not have afforded the party adequate relief since the administrative agency has no right to repeal or declare unconstitutional zoning ordinances enacted by
the legislative body from which the board derives its existence." I d.
141. 112 Wis. 2d at 438, 254 N.W.2d at 77.
142. See supra note 125 and accompanying text.
143. Zinn, ll2 Wis. 2d at 438, 334 N.W.2d at 77.
144. WIS. STAT.§ 227.12 (1981-82).
145. Zinn, 112 Wis. 2d at 427, 334 N.W.2d at 72.
146. Foster v. City of Detroit, 254 F. Supp. 655 (E.D. Mich. 1966), aff'd, 405 F.2d
138 (6th Cir.1968); City of Buffalo, v. J.W. Clement Co., 28 N.Y.2d 241,255 N.E.2d 896,321
N.Y.S.2d 345 (1971). In the official map cases too, the courts have held that no taking occurs
until an owner applies for a permit on a mapped street. Platt v. City of New York, 276 A.D.
873,93 N.Y.S.2d 738 (1949). See generally Kucirek & Beuscher, Wisconsin's OjJicial Map Law,
1957 WIS. L. REv. 176.

1454

WISCONSIN LAW REVIEW

associated with the police power/eminent domain distinction 147
while the second is predicated on the doctrine of sovereign immunity
and its effect on the availability of the inverse condemnation remedy
provided in section 32.10 of the Wisconsin Statutes.

A. Statutory Inverse Condemnation and Sovereign Immunity
The rule in Wisconsin is that "[i]n order to commence inverse
condemnation proceedings, . . . a property owner must demonstrate that there has been either an occupation of his property
within the meaning of sec. 32.10, Stats., or a taking, which must be
compensated under art. I, sec. 13, of the Wisconsin Constitution."148 Although the court has modified the test for what constitutes "occupation" to dispense with the traditional requirement of a
showing of "physical occupation or possession" and has made occupation legally synonymous with taking, the claimant in inverse condemnation under sec. 32.10 must nonetheless additionally show that
the governmental entity "occupying" his property is one with the
power of condemnation.
One of the major issues that the Zinn case raised therefore was
whether a sec. 32.10 remedy can apply against the State, or in the
circumstances of this case, against the DNR. In Konrad v. State 149
the court addressed this precise question, under chapter 32 of the
statutes, as it then existed, for the damming of a stream by the Conservation Commission which effected a taking of plaintiff's land by
flooding it. Even though the court found that the State was a "person" within the meaning of the statute, it held that since the State
was not expressly named as one of the entities who may condemn
property the State could not be sued in inverse condemnation. 150
Despite its holding that the State was an improper party in matters
of inverse condemnation under the statute, it found that the plaintiff could recover compensation by proceeding against the Conservation Commission itself. Consequently, it held that the existence of
the statute entitling the plaintiff to proceed against the State agency
satisfied the Constitutional guarantee of art. I, sec. 13 of the Wisconsin Constitution. 151
147, See infra notes 173-81 and accompanying text.
148. Maxey v. Redevelopment Authority of Racine, 94 Wis. 2d 375, 388, 288 N. W .2d
794, 800; accord, Howell Plaza I, 66 Wis. 2d at 726, 730, 266 N.W.2d at 188, 190.
149. 4 Wis. 2d 532, 91 N.W.2d 203 (1958).
150. Id. at 538-39, 91 N.W.2d at 206.
151. Id. at 539, 91 N.W.2d at 207.
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The Wisconsin Supreme Court has steadfastly held to its position that inverse condemnation under the statute is inapplicable
against the state unless the state is specifically mentioned. Thus in
Herro v. Wisconsin Fed. Surp. P. Deve. Corp., 152 the court stated
that "[i]nverse condemnation does not apply against the state because the state has not consented to be sued." 153 While the meaning
of this statement is not entirely clear, it seems to say that the state is
immune from a suit in inverse condemnation unless there is a statute
expressly waiving this immunity and permitting such suits according to conditions and procedures prescribed therein.
As in Konrad, so in Zinn, the court accepted the State's contention that the Wisconsin eminent domain law, embodied in chapter
32, by itself does not authorize an inverse condemnation suit directly against the State. 154 As in Konrad, so also in Zinn, the court
found that sec. 32.02 which expressly names the agencies to which
the legislation has delegated condemnation powers excludes the
State from that list despite the fact that sec. 32.01 defines the term
"person" as including the State. 155 Thus, the court was unwilling to
broaden the scope of the inverse condemnation remedy under sec.
32.10 beyond that expressly permitted by the legislature, since to do
so would have subjected the state to suit without its consent as legislatively expressed and as embodied in art. IV, sec. 27 156 of the Wisconsin Constitution. "Under this provision the legislature has the
exclusive right to consent to suits against the state." 157
152. 42 Wis. 2d 87, 166 N.W.2d 433 (1969).
153. Id. at 117, 116 N.W.2d at 449.
154. Zinn, 112 Wis. 2d at 434, 334 N.W.2d at 75. However, W1s. STAT.§ 32.02(12)
(1981-82) would seem to allow inverse condemnation suits directly against the state because
that section refers to any "person" which, under§ 32.01, covers also the state.
155. See Zinn, 112 Wis. 2d at 434, 334 N.W.2d at 75.
156. WIS. CONST. art. IV,§ 27 provides:
The legislature shall direct by law in what manner and in what courts suits may be
brought against the state.
157. Zinn,l12Wis. 2dat434-35, 334N.W.2dat 75 (citing Fiala v. Voight, 93 Wis. 2d
337, 342, 286 N.W.2d 924, 927 (1980) (wrongful conversion of plaintiff's fish by DNR officers)). See also Cords v. State, 62 Wis. 2d 42, 49-50, 214 N.W.2d 405, 409 (1974). The doctrine of sovereign immunity is procedural in nature and when successfully raised deprives the
court of personal jurisdiction over the state. Consequently, the state cannot be sued without
its consent. Lister v. Board of Regents, 72 Wis. 2d 282,291,240 N.W.2d 610,617 (1976). On
the other hand, the court has abrogated the so-called governmental immunity defense of the
state or any of its political subdivisions for tort actions, among others, on the theory that this
immunity, unlike sovereign immunity, was judicially created, and therefore could be abolished notwithstanding legislative inertia to correct inequities and anomalies of the doctrine.
Hoeytz v. Milwaukee, 17 Wis. 2d 26, 37, 115 N.W.2d 618, 623 (1962).
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Similarly, the court found the same barrier also precluded a suit
against the DNR. 158 Although the DNR has the power of condemnation in limited circumstances, which requires the consent of the
legislature, 15 9 that was not the situation here. Thus, unlike the situation in Konrad, where the court found that the plaintiff's right to
sue the state agency provided the necessary remedy, in Zinn the barrier of sovereign immunity stood as a total bar leaving the plaintiff
without any remedy. 160 Zinn, therefore, urged the court to reconsider the interpretation it had placed on sec. 32.10 in Konrad. 161 She
argued that the State, as sovereign, has a plenary power of condemnation as an attribute of its sovereignty, and as such the legislative
exclusion of the State from those empowered to condemn should not
be a limitation on the State's liability. 162
The plaintiff's logic has an apparent compelling force; afterall,
the state qua state is the ultimate possessor and fountain of the
power of condemnation. However, while this is true as an abstract
proposition, historically the power of eminent domain has been an
exclusively legislative function. 163 The legislature, as the representative of the people, must in the first instance determine who may be
empowered to condemn, for what purposes, and under what procedures. Otherwise, the courts would be usurping legislative functions.
This explains why the courts faithfully repeat the generally accepted axiom of law that "[e]minent domain statutes are in derogation of the common law rules and must be strictly construed." 164
There are limitations, however, to the prerogative of the legislature to hide behind the shield of sovereign immunity, as embodied in
art. IV, sec. 27 of the Constitution, and to its exclusive power to
determine the circumstances under which an inverse condemnation
158. Zinn, 112 Wis. 2d at 434, 334 N. W.2d at 75. The court's ruling is consistent with
generally prevailing law in all jurisdictions because "the remedy of inverse condemnation, by
the very premise which gives rise to it, is available only as against defendants who possess the
power of eminent domain." 3 NICHOLS', supra note 10, at§ 8.1[4), 18-39. But see Fountain v.
Metropolitan Atlanta Rapid Transit Auth., 678 F.2d 1038 (11th Cir. 1982) where a contrary
result was reached.
159. See WIS. STAT.§ 32.02 (1981-82) entitled Who May Condemn, provides:
The department of natural resources with the approval of the appropriate standing
committees of each house of the legislature was determined by the presiding officer
thereof and as authorized by law, for acquisition of lands.
. 160. Zinn v. State (Ct. App. Dist. II, 1982) (unpublished opinion) reprinted in Respondent-Petitioner's brief at App. 114.
161. Id. at 17-20.
162. !d. at 21.
163. See Stoebuck, supra note 11, at 569.
164. Maxey v. Redevelopment Authority of Racine, 94 Wis.2d 375, 399, 288 N. W.2d
794,805.
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remedy will lie against the state. To deny such a remedy on the basis
of sovereign immunity or the inadequacies of sec. 32.10 would have
rendered nugatory the compensation clauses of the federal and state
constitutions. Consequently, the court in Zinn was forced to reinterpret, or at least clarify, the import of Konrad and the relationship
between art. IV, sec. 27 and art. I, sec. 13 of the state constitution.
Accordingly, it concluded that the failure of the legislature to make
provisions for the payment of compensation when property is taken
is immaterial. "If there is no legislation that makes provision for
compensation for property taken, '[t]he Constitution does; and that
is enough' " 165 because compensation for property taken "[i]s a constitutional necessity rather than a legislative dole." 166
The court found an implicit "waiver" to the bar of sovereign
immunity, and thus found that the State had consented to suit, in
the "self-executing" nature of the constitutional guarantee of just
compensation. 167 It reasoned that the doctrine of sovereign immunity and the just compensation clause must be read together. While
the legislature has the sole power to provide specific procedures governing recovery in inverse condemnation, thereby implementing art.
IV, sec. 27, where no such remedy is available under a statute the
injured owner is free to base his suit directly under art. I, sec. 13 of
the Constitution. 168 Therefore, the court concluded that the reach
of art. IV, sec. 27 is limited by art. I, sec. 13, and held that Zinn
stated a claim directly under the latter provision, which permits
compensation. 169 Thus, Zinn was allowed to prove damages at trial
on remand.
B. The Implications of ZINN for an Inverse Condemnation Remedy
in Police Power "Takings"

In holding that Zinn was entitled to prove damages at trial, the
court rejected the State's contentions that the exclusive method of
error correction (administrative rescission) lay within the quasi-ju165. Zinn, 112 Wis.2d at 436, 334 N.W.2d at 76 (quoting Laurel, Inc. v. State, 169
Conn. 195, 200, 362 A.2d 1383, 1387 (1975)). See also SBR v. Board of Cty. Comm'rs of
Larimer, 43 Colo. App. 14, 18-19,601 P.2d 1082, 1085 (1979) (residence destroyed by government while coping with flood emergency is a taking).
166. Zinn, 112 Wis. 2d at 436, 334 N.W.2d at 76 (quoting Luber v. Milwaukee
County, 47 Wis. 2d 271, 277, 177 N.W.2d 380, 383 (1980)).
167. Id. at 435,334 N.W.2d at 76 (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS§895B
comment a (1977)).
168. Id. at 437-438, 334 N.W.2d at 77.
169. Id.
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dicial structure 170 and that creating a cause of action for an error in
such a context has serious negative financial implications for the
state coffer. 1 71 The court, however, found persuasive Justice
Brennan's opinion in San Diego regarding the following three propositions. First, the fifth amendment requires compensation for any
sort of taking, whether it is accomplished through formal condemnation, physical invasion, occupancy, or police power regulation. Second, the obligation to compensate arises as soon as the taking occurs. Finally, mere invalidation of an offending police power
regulation is insufficient to meet the compensation requirement. 1 72
The court's agreement with these propositions raises the question whether the court will treat police power "takings" in the same
way as it treated the taking in Zinn. In the past, although the courts
have frequently recognized the difficulty of drawing a sharp line between the police power and eminent domain, 173 they have just as
frequently distinguished between the remedies available for constitutional violations of the two powers. 174 The remedies have bee.n
different, notwithstanding the fact that courts have found police
power actions to be "takings." Thus, in the context of land use regulations, the usual remedy has been invalidation of an overly regulatory restriction. 17 5
170. Appellant's brief at 17, Zinn v, State, 112 Wis. 2d 417, 334 N.W.2d 67 (1983)
(citing Metzger v. Dept. of Taxation, 35 Wis. 2d 119, 129, 150 N.W.2d 431, (1967));
Kosmatka v. DNR, 77 Wis. 2d 558,253 N.W.2d 887 (1977); Sewerage Comm'n of Milwaukee
v. DNR, 102 Wis. 2d 613, 621, 297 N.W.2d 40 reh. denied, 104 Wis. 2d 182, 307 N.W.2d 189
(1981).
171. Appellant's brief at 20-23 Zinn.
172. Zinn, 112 Wis. 2d at 428-31, 334 N.W.2d at 72-74.
173. For example:
The distinction between the exercise of the police power and condemnation has been
said to be a matter of degree or damage to the property owner. In the valid exercise of
the police power reasonably restricting the use of the property, the damage suffered
by the owner is said to be incidental. However, where the restriction is so great that
the landowner ought not to bear such a burden for the public good, the restriction has
been held to be a constructive taking even though the actual use or forbidden use has
not been transferred to the government so as to be a taking in the traditional sense.
Just v. Marinette County, 56 Wis. 2d 7, 15, 201 N.W.2d 761, 767. See also Stefan Auto Body
v. State Highway Comm'n, 21 Wis. 2d 363, 369, 124 N.W.2d 319, 323 (1963).
174. See French v. City of New York, 385 N.Y.S.2d 5, 350 N.E.2d 381,39 N.Y.2d 589
(1976). The court there described the gravement of a regulatory "taking" challenge as being
based on the invalid exercise of the police power under the due process clause rather than on an
actual taking under the eminent domain clause. Similarly, the California Supreme Court refused to equate excesses of police power use with "the lawful taking of property by eminent
domain . . . . " Agins v. City of Tiburon, 24 Cal.3d 266, 273, 598 P.2d 25, 28, 157 Cal. Rptr.
372, 375 (1979).
175. For a recent example of an ordinance which was struck down because it effected
a taking under the guise of the exercise of the police power, see Nagawicka Island Corp. v.
City of Delafield, 117 Wis. 2d 23, 343 N.W.2d 816 (Ct. App. 1983). In that case, the Court of
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Courts have refused to award compensation in police power
taking cases on the theory that a purported exercise of the police
power is different in kind from "[a]n actual appropriation . . . by
title or governmental occupation." 176 On the other hand, they have
been quick to find and award compensation for takings where governmental activity has caused physical damage to property or has
interfered with property rights. 177 The courts have supported the
award of compensation in the latter cases on the theory that injunctive relief is either against the public interest or insufficient to remedy a harm that the owner has already suffered. 178
The doctrinal distinction between the police power and eminent
domain has been used to foreclose the inverse condemnation remedy
in land use regulation cases raising the taking issue. Thus, in Agins v.
City of Tiburon, 179 the California Supreme Court held that the only
remedy open to a landowner aggrieved by a harsh land use regulation is to challenge the constitutional validity of the ordinance or
the manner of its application to his property through mandamus or
declaratory judgment; he may never seek compensation on the theory of inverse condemnation, however. 180 Indeed, the New York
Court of Appeals has stated that the cases which have referred to a
"taking" in the context of an invalid exercise of the police power
were using the term only "metaphorically." 181
In the past, the Wisconsin Supreme Court itself seems to have
intended a similar metaphor. To be sure, it has acknowledged that
the argument that a police power regulation will never constitute a
taking, "[c]arried to its ultimate conclusion would make unnecesAppeals invalidated the city's A-1 agricultural classification which required a minimum lot of
three acres before any building could take place in an agricultural zone. Since the island property involved only two acres, the classification effectively prevented the owners from building
on their property. The court held that the city's asserted justifications of health, safety and
welfare were insufficient to sustain "complete confiscation" of the owners' land use. I d. at 28,
343 N.W.2d at 849.
176. French v. City of New York, 39 N.Y.2d 587, 595, 350 N.E.2d 381, 386, 385
N.Y.S.2d 5, 9-10 (1976).
177. Pumpelly v. Green Bay Co., 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 166, illustrates the physical damage proposition while United States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 250 (1946) exemplifies the interference with title doctrine.
178. "Inverse condemnation . . . provides the remedy where an injunction would not
be in the public interest. . . . "Thornburg v. Port of Portland, 233 Or. 178, 81-82, 376 P.2d
100, 106 (1962).
179. 24 Cal. 3d 266, 598 P.2d 25, 157 Cal. Rptr. 372 (1979).
180. ld. at 273, 598 P.2d at 29-30, 157 Cal. Rptr. at 375.
181. French, 385 N.Y.2d 5, 9, 350 N.E.2d 381, 385, 39 N.Y.S.2d 587, 594. The source
of confusion regarding the question whether the excessive use of the police power can ever
result in a "taking" is Justice Holmes' dictum in Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S.
393, 443 (1922). See supra note 30.
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sary the power of eminent domain." 182 However, it has never
awarded compensation for an unconstitutional regulation amounting to a "taking."
In one of the earliest cases which raised the taking issue in the
context of a police power regulation creating without compensation
a wild-life refuge on the defendant's property, the Wisconsin
Supreme Court found the legislative act invalid insofar as it
amounted to a "taking" of property in violation of the state constitution. 183 The court has consistently found such acts violative of the
State constitution. 184 In the zoning field, the court has stated in dictum that, "[i]f the limitation on use is in the nature of a taking in
whole or in part for public purposes, then the constitution requires
compensation to be paid, as otherwise there is a taking without
compensation." 185
·
Yet never before has the Wisconsin Supreme Court gone beyond voiding unconstitutional regulations to require the payment of
compensation for the period in which an offending police power regulation was in effect. 186 This judicial reluctance to order damages
during the interim period that a landowner's property may have
been taken by an excessive use of the police power can sometimes
produce harsh results. Yet, when the courts void an excessive regulation or order an injunction it is because it would otherwise result in a
taking.
Under traditional doctrine, the facts of Zinn fit more the concept of eminent domain than that of the police power. In tpe typical
regulatory taking case, title or possession remains with the owner.
In Zinn, on the other hand, the court accepted the plaintiff's allegation that title or possession passed to the State, or at least that the
182. State v. Herwig, 17 Wis. 2d 442, 447, 117 N.W.2d 335, 338 (1962).
183. Id. In that case, the State, using its police power, created a game refuge over
defendant's land which the defendant contended resulted in a taking without compensation.
The State contended that the regulations in question, which forbade the defendant from
shooting any game on his land despite the damage the latter caused to him, were in the interest of wild life conservation. The court rejected the State's contention and concluded that the
state could accomplish its purpose only by purchase, lease or condemnation because the use of
its police power in this case exceeded proper limits.
184. See, e.g., Bino v. Hurley, 273 Wis.10, 76 N.W.2d 571 (1956) where the court held
unconstitutional, because it constituted a "taking" without compensation, an anti-pollution
ordinance which prohibited owners of land surrounding a lake from bathing, boating, or swimming in it.
185. Buhler v. Racine County, 33 Wis. 2d 137, 143, 146 N.W.2d 403, 406 (1966).
186. See City of Kansas City v. Kindle, 446 S.W.2d 807 (Mo. 1969) (discussing the
old compensatory zoning approach); City of Austin v. Teague, 570 S.W.2d 389 (Tex. 1978);
Ventures in Property I v. City of Wichita, 225 Kan. 698,594 P.2d 671 (1979); Brazil v. City of
Auburn, 23 Wash. App. 390, 598 P.2d 1 (1979).
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State interfered with the plaintiff's title or possession. While this
circumstance may distinguish Zinn from regulatory taking cases,
the court found persuasive Justice Brennan's proposition in San
Diego that the manner and context of the taking were constitutionally irrelevant. 187
In San Diego, Justice Brennan laid bare the doctrinal asymmetry implicit in the judicial willingness to find an unconstitutional
regulatory "taking" and yet the judicial reluctancy to award compensation in such cases. That case raised the issue of whether an
inverse condemnation remedy is available to redress overly restrictive zoning regulations. The Supreme Court declined to rule on the
issue because it determined that there was no final judgment from
the state appellate court and dismissed the appeal for want of jurisdiction.188 However, four Justices dissented and, finding that there
was a final judgment, reached the merits. 189 On the merits, the dissent concluded that the "open space" zoning involved in the case
effectively took the beneficial use of plaintiff's property. 190 As such,
since "[n]othing in the Just Compensation Clause suggests that 'takings' must be permanent and irrevocable," 191 the dissent concluded
that the Just Compensation Clause compels the payment of damages for a temporary reversible police power taking. 192
Justice Brennan's conclusion in San Diego is based on two major premises. First, both as a logical and practical matter, the payment of compensation is necessary to make the landowner whole for
the period during which he suffered harm as a consequence of a taking.193 Implicit in this is the recognition that the traditional invalidation remedy is inadequate to make a landowner whole. Second,
from the government's point of view, the benefit it derives from the
regulation is no less than the benefit it would have acquired had it
proceeded in formal condemnation. 194
187. Zinn, 112 Wis. 2d at 429, 334 N.W.2d 72-73.
188. 450 u.s. 621, 633 (1981).
189. I d. at 637. Justices Stewart, Marshall and Powell joined Brennan's dissent. In a
concurring opinion, Justice Rehnquist stated that if he "were satisfied that this appeal was
from a final judgement or decree of the California Court of Appeals . . . I would have little
difficulty agreeing with much of what is said in the dissenting opinion of Justice Brennan." I d.
at 633-34.
190. Id. at 652-53.
191. Id. at 657.
192. Id.
193. Id. at 655, 657.
194. I d. at 652-53. Justice Brennan recognized, however, that "[a] different case may
arise where a police power regulation is not enacted in furtherance of the public health, safety,
morals, or general welfare so that there may be no 'public use.'" I d. at 656 n.23. Nevertheless,
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Justice Brennan's opinion in San Diego has begun to play a significant role in recent developments in the "takings" area.I 95 In
Hernandez v. City of Lafayette, I96 the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals
applied the Brennan rule as if it were a holding. Hernandez was a
section 1983I 97 claim by a landowner against the city and its mayor
for alleged deprivation of property without due process of law and
without compensation in violation of the fifth and fourteenth
amendments as a result of the city's failure to rezone the plaintiff's
land. Even though the court noted that San Diego was a suit under
state law, it found Justice Brennan's reasoning equally applicable to
a section 1983 suit.I 98 It concluded that the plaintiff was entitled to

even in such a case, a landowner may bring an action under section 1983 for a fourteenth
amendment due process violation. I d. See also infra note 78 and accompanying text.
195. Devines v. Maier, 665 F.2d 138 (7th Cir. 1981), expressly relied on Justice
Brennan's opinion to hold that a regulatory taking of plaintiff's leasehold rights is compensable under the fifth amendment. In so holding, the court rejected the City of Milwaukee's
argument that, since the plaintiffs in the case were tenants of uninhabitable tenements, the
latter had no enforceable rights to begin with. It also rejected the City's argument that police
power enforcement of a housing code does not result in a taking which is subject to compensation. See also Burrows v. City of Keene, 121 N.H. 590, 432 A.2d I5 (1981) where the court
again relying on Justice Brennan's opinion held that the City's zoning of plaintiff's property
such as to include it in a conservation district constituted a compensable regulatory taking.
196. 643 F.2d 1188, reh'g denied, 649 F.2d 336 (5th Cir. 1981).
197. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1976) (amended in 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1979)) provides:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of State or Territory, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the
United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of
any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be
liable to the party injured in action at Jaw, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding
for redress.
The term "person" includes municipalities and other local governing bodies. See Monell v.
Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658, 690 (1978). Section 1983 applies to zoning cases.
In Lake County Estates, Inc. v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency, 440 U.S. 391 (1979), the
court also denied eleventh amendment immunity to the Tahoe Regional Planning Agency (an
interstate compact agency) but held that the agency members are absolutely immune from a
damage suit when they act in a legislative capacity. Section 1983, however, does not provide a
cause of action against the state because of the state's eleventh amendment immunity. See
Quern v. Jordan, 440 U.S. 332 (1979). The holding of Quern, therefore, protects state land use
regulation from attack. It should be noted that a section 1983 damage claim is, of necessity,
different from an inverse condemnation claim. Although the measure of damages in a section
1983 claim includes the damages caused a landowner by his inability to develop or use his
property during the period an unconstitutional action was in force, it does not seek forced
compensation for the property. Nevertheless, a section 1983 claim parallels an inverse condemnation claim. See Stubbs, Use of Civil Rights Law by Property Owners, 1981 INSTITUTE ON
PLANNING, ZONING, AND EMINENT DOMAIN, SOUTHWESTERN LEGAL FOUNDATION 213, 225; see
also Bley, Use of the Civil Rights Acts to Recover Money Damages for the Overregulation of Land,
14 URB. LAW. 223 (1982).
198. Hernandez, 643 F.2d at 1200.
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prove damages "in an amount equal to just compensation for the
value of the property during the period of the 'taking."' 199
Although the Hernandez court found the Brennan rule applica. ble to section 1983 suits, it introduced a major modification to it. It
questioned the wisdom of establishing as, Justice Brennan proposed,
the date of taking as the date of the enactment of an ordinance.
Therefore, it stated that a taking does not occur "until the municipality's governing body is given a realistic opportunity and a reasonable time within which to review its zoning legislation vis-a-vis
the particular property and to correct the inequity." 200
The Hernandez modification of the Brennan rule is reasonable
and accords with the notion of exhaustion of administrative remedies. 201 First, until a landowner has applied for a variance or permit,
it is difficult to determine whether he has suffered any harm to begin
with. Second, considering the pervasiveness and importance of land
use regulations, the regulating authorities should be given an opportunity to consider the effects of a regulation on a particular individual and to make particularized determinations. Finally, such a rule
would, on the one hand, offer a governmental agency an opportunity
to save itself from potential financial liability by acting expeditiously and, on the other hand, would enable property owners to
force reasonably quick decisions by the government.
T,he Brennan rule as modified by Hernandez is sound and should
be adopted in Wisconsin. Hazardous and premature as it may be to
predict in this murky area, the Wisconsin Supreme Court's willingness to find a compensable temporary taking in an unprecedented
context and its unqualified agreement with Justice Brennan's rule
may well indicate the path taking jurisprudence will take in Wisconsin. Moreover, quite apart from the court's further agreement with
Justice Brennan that, ". . . the applicability of express constitutional guarantees is not a matter to be determined on the basis of
policy judgments made by the legislative, executive or judicial
branches," 202 the policy arguments themselves do not conclusively
militate against requiring the payment of compensation in police
power taking cases.

199. Id.
200. Id.
201. See Freilich, Solving the "Taking" Equation: Making the Whole the Sum of its
Parts, 15 URBAN LAW 447, 473 (1983).
202. Zinn, 112 Wis. 2d at 431, 334 N.W.2d at 74 (quoting San Diego, 450 U.S. at 661
(1980)).
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C. The Contending Policy Considerations
The notion of allowing the remedy of inverse condemnation 203
for police power regulations, particularly those involving zoning,
has been questioned on various policy grounds.
The California Supreme Court 204 has noted some of these concerns: 1) the threat of monetary relief will have a chilling effect on
police power regulatory functions and discourage innovative planning; 2) inverse condemnation awards will saddle local governments
with unlimited financial burdens and thereby render budgeting processes difficult; 3) a court to grant monetary relief in such cases
"seems" an usurpation of legislative power; 4) determining the
amount of compensation will be difficult; and 5) placing the plaintiff
in the position he would have been before the zoning ordinance by
issuing an injunction is a sufficient remedy. 205
As persuasive and strong as these considerations may be, they
can be countered with equally strong-perhaps even strongercountervailing policies. First, underlying the taking test in Wisconsin is a fundamental policy judgment that weighs public benefits
against individual losses. In other words, as the court has steadfastly said, where the burden of a police power restriction on an individual for the benefit of the public is so great that it is more than he
should bear as a member of the public, the restriction will be held to
constitute a constructive taking. 206 Implicit in this balancing process is some notion of fairness 207 which protects the individual from
203. Hagman, supra note 140, suggests a "third alternative," i.e., payment of "interim damages."
204. Agins v. City of Tiburon, 24 Cal. 3d 266, 276, 598 P.2d 25, 30, 157 Cal. Rptr.
372,377 (1979). See also Note, Inverse Condemnation: Its Availability in Challenging the Validity of a Zoning Ordinance, 26 STAN. L. REV. 1439, 1450 (1974); Baumgardner, "Takings"
Under the Police Power-The Development of Inverse Condemnation as a Method of Challenging
Zoning Ordinances, 30 S.W.L.J. 723, 736-38 (1976).
205. Agins, 24 Cal. 3d at 275-77, 598 P.2d at 30-31, 157 Cal. Rptr. at 377-78. See also,
Mandelker, Land Use Takings: The Compensation Issue, 8 HASTINGS CONST. L. Q. 491, 499

(1!l81). In this commentator's view, the position that equates excessive land use regulations
with eminent domain takings and compels compensation in both cases suffers from a "compensation syllogism." Id. at 498. The weakness of this position, however, is that its doctrinaire and dogmatic adherence to the police power/eminent domain distinction compels it to
elevate form over substance: that is, to deny compensation just because a case presents the
exercise of the police power even when its effects are as harsh as when eminent domain is
involved is to deny the fundamental policies served by the Just Compensation Clause. See also
infra note 207.
206. Just v. Marinette County, 56 Wis. 2d 7, 15, 201 N.W.2d 761, 767 (1972).
207. As Justice Frankfurter said in United States v. Dickinson, 331 U.S. 745, 748
(1947): "The Fifth Amendment expresses a principle of fairness and not a technical rule of
procedure. . . . " Professor Costo¥lis has also suggested that a so-called "accommodation
power" looks to "fairness" as the most reasonable means of reconciling the police power's
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the excesses of governmental action, even when done in the name of
the public good. That excess is measured by the taking test which
requires a determination whether a restriction deprives a property
owner "of all or substantially all beneficial use of his property." 208
At the same time, as the court indicated in Howell Plaza I, one major reason that a claimant in inverse condemnation in public improvement cases must allege loss of all or substantially all of the use
of his property is precisely to allow a governmental entity to exercise
its legislative judgment. 209
Implicit in the test, then, is the conviction that beyond a certain point the policy of protecting a government entity's legislative
function collides with the constitutional guarantees of the taking
and compensation clauses. Significantly, that point of collision, absent physical invasion, is the same whether the case involves police
power regulations or condemnation blight. It would thus be anomalous and unfair to deny recovery in police power taking cases simply
because police power and eminent domain may be different or have
differing doctrinal bases.
Second, assumptions to the contrary notwithstanding, the mere
repeal or judicial invalidation of a police power regulation does not
compensate a landowner for the loss, no matter how great, that he
may have suffered as a result of the regulation. 210 The argument
that cautions against imposing considerable liabilities against the
government ignores the staggering losses that overly harsh regulations can impose on landowners. 211
Third, the present structure of remedies, which is cast in terms
of a total win or loss, is destructive of a comprehensive zoning plan
since, under the present system, if a landowner successfully attacks
a zoning law, his land goes completely unregulated. 212 If inverse
condemnation or interim damages were allowed, however, the presabsence of compensation and the eminent domain's requirement of "Just Compensation."
Costonis, supra note 29 at 1049-60.
208. Just v. Marinette County, 56 Wis. 2d at 15, 201 N.W.2d at 767.
209. Howell Plaza I, 66 Wis. 2d at 728-29, 226 N.W.2d at 189-90.
210. In San Diego, 450 U.S. at 655 n.22, Justice Brennan indicates: "[t]he instant
litigation is a good case in point. The trial court, on April 9, 1976, found the city's actions
effected a 'taking' of appellant's property on June 19, 1973. If true, then appellant has been
deprived of all beneficial use of its property in violation of the Just Compensation Clause for
the past seven years." Moreover, "[i]nvalidation hardly prevents enactment of subsequent
unconstitutional regulations by the government entity." I d. Indeed, according to the advice
of a California city attorney to fellow city attorneys, if the battle is lost in the courts, the war
outside is not: "IF ALL ELSE FAILS, MERELY AMEND THE REGULATION AND
START OVER AGAIN." Id.
211. Hagman, supra note 140, at 134.
212. Baumgardner, supra note 204, at 737.
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sure on the landowner to have a restriction on his land lifted and the
pressure on the courts to do so would be minimized. 213
Fourth, the threat of financial liability may also help to induce
governing bodies and citizens to consider carefully and seriously the
consequences of a land use restriction and produce more rational bases of decisionmaking. If the consequences of a zoning restriction are
to be felt only by the few, however, the majority are not likely to
consider them with care, responsibility, and fairness. 214
Fifth, the fear that local governments will be faced with unlimited liability can be mitigated by adopting the "reasonable time"
standard that the Hernandez court enunciated. Moreover, the fact
that the taking will be found only when there is a total or substantial
loss suggests that few takings requiring compensation are likely to
be found. Also, since the measure of damages is the difference between the value of the property as regulated and its value as it could
have been constitutionally regulated, 215 the possible financial exposure of the government will be greatly reduced. Finally, proof that
the restriction was the proximate cause of the substantial or total
loss of a landowner's property, apart from other factors such as infiation, can be difficult. ·
The contending policies reviewed above indicate that the case
against inverse condemnation or interim damages for police power
takings is not justified in principle or practice. Since the fifth amendment and its Wisconsin counterpart are designed to bar the government from imposing public burdens on a few people, and since the
police power and eminent domain both can secure public benefits,
denial of inverse condemnation recovery in police power cases
merely because police power is the theory for the recovery is an argument based on formal distinctions rather than on substance. Just v.
Marinette County 216 is instructive on this point. The court upheld
the ordinance in that case in order to preserve the environment in its
natural and pristine state. While environmental preservation is
surely a laudable goal, it need not have been achieved by, in effect,
forcing the landowner to dedicate the land to public use. An alternative would have been to uphold the ordinance but to compensate the
owner for his permanent loss. The solution was probably not avail213. I d.; see also Dunham, From Rural Enclosure toRe-Enclosure of Urban Land, 35
N.Y.U.L. REV. 1238, 1253 (1960).
214. Dunham, supra note 213, at 1253-54.
215. Hagman, supra note 140, at 132.
216. 56 Wis. 2d 7, 201 N.W.2d 761 (1972). The court has since limited the force of its
holding in that case to the special concerns of environmental legislation. See Howell Plaza II,
92 Wis. 2d at 85, 284 N.W.2d at 892.

Zinn v. State

1984:1431

1467

able to the court because the taking jurisprudence dogmatically associates one remedy with one form of power or other. This persistence in an all or nothing approach, however, can drain the federal
and state guarantees of compensation of their content in particular
cases.
IV.

CONCLUSION

Zinn presented the Wisconsin Supreme Court with an unprecedented "taking" question. It thus provided the court with a major
opportunity to clarify some of the ambiguities of prior case law.
Zinn has established that a taking is no less a taking because it is
temporary. It has further established that once a taking is found,
albeit temporary, the Constitution demands payment of compensation and that the doctrine of sovereign immunity is no bar to a claim
of taking. Furthermore, although the test for taking in Wisconsin is
rather restrictive, Zinn stands for the propositions that the test is
uniform and that the context of the taking is constitutionally
irrelevant.
The Zinn court's adoption of a unitary test for a variety of contexts, absent physical invasion, and its finding of a compensable
temporary taking in an unusual context suggest that Zinn may have
implications on the compensability of regulatory temporary takings. The court's broad agreement with the San Diego dissent regarding the constitutional irrelevance of the context and duration of
taking makes the suggestion even stronger.
Awarding compensation for temporary takings is bound to expand to some degree the scope of inverse liability of the state as well
as some local governments. For that reason, some have advanced
policy grounds to limit the remedy for regulatory takings to mere
invalidation of a police power regulation. While the force of these
policies is considerable, equally forceful are the policies militating in
favor of compensation in order to protect landowners from severe
uncompensated losses. In Wisconsin, moreover, since the restrictiveness of the taking test is itself a product of these same competing
policies, and allows a finding of taking only in extreme cases, it
would be unfair to leave the individual owner with all the losses despite "express" constitutional guarantees, simply because a piece of
legislation happens to be enacted under the police power. Therefore,
in the future, courts should drop the "taking" metaphor and the alior-nothing approach to remedies and allow inverse condemnation
recovery even in zoning cases once they have determined that a regulation has resulted in a taking.
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Finally, whether or not Zinn governs regulatory cases, the Zinn
opinion and that of San Diego are bound to send a powerful message
both to the regulators and the regulated. The enhancement of the
protection of private property that these two opinions represent is
likely to encourage landowners to seek damages instead of injunctions they have sought in the past. At the same time, if a regulatory
taking is held to be compensable, the regulators will be more likely
to plan carefully and within constitutional limits than they have
been heretofore.
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